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I. Introduction
In a pioneering paper, Debreu [4] extended the second fundamental
theorem of welfare economics to economies with a topological vector
space of commodities. Specifically, he showed that corresponding to
a given Pareto optimal allocation of such an economy, there exists
a price system at which the given allocation can be sustained as a
valuation equilibrium. Debreu formalized the notion of a price system
as a non-zero element of the topological dual of the commodity space
and assumed, in particular, that the aggregate production set of the
economy has a nonempty interior. Under this assumption and given con-
vexity, Debreu could prove his result as a consequence of the sup-
porting hyperplane theorem.
Recent work in mathematical economics (see Mas-Colell [11] and
the references therein) has questioned Debreu's justification of the
interiority assumption. This work has emphasized the importance of
several spaces, none of which has a positive cone with a nonempty
interior. Thus, the economic assumptions of "free disposal" or
"monotonic preferences" do not lead, as in the case of [4] or in the
subsequent work of Bewley [2], to a set which needs to be supported
and which has a nonempty interior. Indeed, it now appears that from
the point of view of economic theory, R and L may be the only
interesting spaces for which this is true. Furthermore, we now have
simple examples of economies for which Debreu's theorem does not hold;
see Jones [8] and also [11, 12].
Thus, there are two natural directions in which one can proceed.
The first is to look for additional conditions on the underlying
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parameters of the economy under which Debreu's theorem can be proved.
This is the approach of Mas-Colell [11, 12] and of subsequent work that
utilizes his concept of "proper preferences." Alternatively, one can
look for satisfactory approximate versions of Debreu's result as is
done in [9] and in another context by Aliprantis, Brown and Burkinshaw
[1]. This is the direction that we pursue in this paper, although we
also present a sufficient condition on an individual production set
under which we obtain an exact result.
Our work uses in an essential way recent results in functional
analysis. For our approximate results, the basic idea is to find an
"approximate" support to the closure of a set with an empty interior.
This then leads to the question of finding sufficient conditions that
are attractive in terms of economic theory and under which the sum of
closed convex sets is closed. We present two such conditions. The
first is due to the collective efforts of Choquet [3], Dieudonne [6]
and Ky Fan [7] and it allows us to set our results in real, Hausdorff
locally convex spaces. The second condition leads us to restrict the
commodity space to those spaces which are strictly hypercomplete [15,
Sections 12-2 and 12-3]. Our exact result, perhaps not surprisingly
for functional analysts, draws on the Bishop-Phelps theorem, specifi-
cally a result [13] whose importance for economic theory was first seen
by Majumdar [10]. More generally, however, our results bring out the
relevance of functional analytic methods for a rather basic problem in
mathematical economics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
and results and Section 3 the proofs.
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2. The Model and Results
For the basic terminology and notation we follow Wilansky [15].
However, for ease of exposition we recall some basic concepts for the
reader.
Let [E, F, v] be a dual pair , i.e., E, F are vector spaces over
the reals and v is a bilinear functional on ExF and written v(x,y) =
[x, y] and such that (a) [x, y] = for all y in F implies x = and
(b) [x, y] = for all x in E implies y = 0.
In what follows, E will be given the interpretation of a commodity
space, F that of a price space and v a valuation functional. Thus
[x, y] denotes the value of a commodity bundle y in E at the price x
in F.
As is customary, we shall abbreviate a dual pair to be [E, F] and
assume that some bilinear functional is specified. In the special
case that F CT E* where E* is the algebraic dual of E, the bilinear
functional is given by <x, y> = y(x) for any x in E and for any y in
F.
For any dual pair [E, F], a Hausdorff locally convex topology T on
E (respectively F) is said to be compatible with the dual pair if the
topological dual of E, E' (respectively F'), is F (respectively E).
We shall respectively denote the weak, strong and Mackey topolo-
gies, say, on E as a(E, F)
, 6(E, F) and x(E, F). We shall refer to
the topology a(E', E) as the weak * topology and to 8(E', E) as the
strong * topology. Thus, for example, a weak * closed subset of E'
should be taken to mean a a(E', E)-closed subset of E.
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When we refer to a set satisfying a particular topological pro-
perty without specifying the topology, it is to be understood that the
said property holds in any compatible topology. In our view, it is
one of the advantages of our approach that we can state the assump-
tions underlying our results in any compatible topology.
In the sequel we shall assume that E is a partially ordered vector
space and F is endowed with an ordering induced by that on E. Given
the recent work of Aliprantis et. al. [1], it may be worth mentioning
that neither E nor F is assumed to be a lattice.
We now turn to our basic economic concepts.
Definition 1 . An economy £ is given by {[E, F]
, _>,
(X(t),
^,
e(t))
t£T ,
(Y(j))jep ) where
(i) [E, F] is a dual pair with (E,
_>) a partially ordered vector
space,
(ii) T is a finite set of consumers such that for each consumer t,
X(t) CL E, ~ is a binary relation on X(t)xX(t) and e(t) £ X(t),
(iii) P is a finite set of producers such that for each producer j,
Y(j)<C E.
For any set S of positive integers, let |s| denote the cardinality
of S.
Definition 2. An allocation (x,y) ={(x(t))_
_,, (y(j)). „} of £ iteT jeP
(|t| + |p|)-tuple such that
(i) x(t) e X(t) for all t in T,
(ii) y(j) e Y(j) for all j e P,
s a
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(iii) I x(t) = S y(j) + E e(t).
teT jeP teT
Definition 3 . An allocation (x,y) of £ is said to be Pareto Optimal
if there does not exist any other allocation (x', y') such that for
all t in T, x'(t) ~ x(t) and for at least one t, x'(t) x(t) where
> u > u . v >a b means a ~ b and not b ~ a.
t t t
Without any confusion, we denote the induced ordering on F also by
>. For any p, q in F, let p > q denote (p-q) _> and (p-q) * 0. Let
N(E), respectively N(F), denote the set of neighborhoods of zero in E,
respectively F.
Definition 4 . For any real number 5 > and any U e N(E), a (6 ,U)-
approximate valuation equilibrium of & consists of a pair (p, (x,y))
such that
(i) p e F, p > and there exists z e U such that [z, p] = -5
.
(ii) (x, y) is an allocation of £ such that
(a) z ~ x(t) implies [z, p] _> [x(t), p] - 6 for all t in T,
(b) z e Y(j) implies [z, p] _< [y(j), p] + 5 for all j in P.
Thus, an approximate valuation equilibrium consists of a price
system and an allocation such that (i) each consumer is approximately
maximizing his preferences subject to a budget set and (ii) each pro-
ducer is approximately maximizing his profits. In each case, the
degree of approximation is measured by 5 and U, the latter controlling
for the fact the price system is not normalized to render this approxi-
mation trivial.
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Our final concept relates to an economy modelled on the dual pair
(I/, L) where L is a semi-normed space.
Definition 5 . A valuation equilibrium of £ is a pair (p, (x,y)) such
that
(i) p e L" P > 0, II pi! = 1.
(ii) (x,y) is an allocation of & such that
(a) z ~ x(t) implies <z, p>
_> <x(t), p> for all t in T.
(b) z £ Y(j) implies <z
,
p>
_< <y(j), p> for all j in P.
For our results we shall need the following assumptions on the
economy £ = {[E, F] , >, (X(t), ~, e (t)) teT » (Y(j)). p }. For any closed,
t •*
convex subset K of E, A(K) denotes the asymptotic cone of K and, follow-
ing [3], is given by ( \ A(K-x) where x is any particular point in K.
X>0
Let E = {x e E: x
_> 0} and E_ = -E .
Al. (a) For all t in T, X(t) is a closed convex subset of E.
(b) There exists convex K C E such that for all t in T, X(t) CK
and K has a lower bound for >.
A2. For all t in T, for any y in X(t), the set R (y) = {x e X(t): x ~ y}
1 t
is closed, convex and contains y.
A3. (a) For all j in P, Y(j) is a closed, convex subset of E.
(b) For all j in P, e Y(j) and (E_) <c Y, YH(-Y) = {0} where
Y = E Y(j) and Y denotes the closure of Y.
jeF
A4. There exists a x in T such that for any x in X(t), y + x ^ x for
T
all y in E
+
/{0}.
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For our first result, we shall need the following conditions in
which for any AdE, A = {p E F: [x,p] [ 1 for all x e A}
.
Choquet Condition : The set K in Al(b) and Y are a(E,F)-complete.
For our next condition, we shall adopt the convention throughout
this paper that locally compact will refer to the a(E,F)-topology.
Dieudonne Condition : The set K in Al(b) and Y are locally compact.
We can now state
Theorem 1 . If S satisfies Al to A4 and if either the Choquet or the
Dieudonne Condition is fulfilled, then for any 6 > and any U e N(E),
for any Pareto optimal allocation (x*,y*) of £, there exists p* e F,
such that (p*,(x*,y*)) is a (6-U) -approximate valuation equilibrium
of a.
Corollary * Theorem 1 is valid if either the Choquet or the Dieudonne
Condition is replaced by the requirement that the x(F,E)-interiors of
K and Y are nonempty .
The Corollary makes clear the fact that the hypotheses relating
to K are no restriction for an economy modelled on the dual pair
[L',L], L a Banach space such that L has a nonempty norm interior.
The hypotheses relating to Y are however a restriction even in these
circumstances and our next two results attempt to cope with this by
restricting the class of locally convex spaces. They also require
the following conditions on X(t), Y(j) and on the mutual position of
the sum of these sets.
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Dieudonne Condition II . (i) There exists a in T such that Z X(t) is
locally compact. (ii) There exists f e P such that Z Y(j) is locally
compact.
Condition A . For any 8(E,F)-bounded set B, ( Z X(t))H ( Z Y(j)+B) is
teT jeP
8(E,F)-bounded.
We can now state
Theorem 2 . Let S satisfy Al to A4, Condition A and the Dieudonne Con-
dition II. If B (E,F)-sequentially closed convex sets are 8(E,F)-closed
and [F,E] is a quasibarrelled dual pair, then the conclusion of
Theorem 1 holds .
Our final result of this genre substitutes the following condition
for the Dieudonne Condition II and, in so doing, allows us to drop
Al(b) and A3(b).
Ky Fan Condition . (i) For any Pareto optimal allocation (x,y),
n
t-1
o
R (x(t)) u p| (T(F,E)-interior ( Z R (x(i))r) * 0, t = 2,...,|t|.
i=l
n
i_1
n
(ii) (Y(i)) U Pl (T(F,E)-interior ( Z Y(j)) U ) t 0, i = 2,...,|p|.
J-l
We can now state
Theorem 3 . Theorem 2 is valid without Al(b) and A3(b) if the Ky Fan
Condition is substituted for the Dieudonne Condition II .
For our next result we model our economy £ on the dual pair [L',L]
where L is a real, locally convex Hausdorff space and L is a normal
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cone for 8(L',L), (see [14, p. 215] for a definition). Moreover, we
shall need to substitute A3' for A3 where
A3'. Y is a closed, convex subset of L'.
We shall also need
Condition B . For any U e N(L), ( E X(t)) p\ (( E e(t) + E Y(j))+U°)
teT teT jeP
is strong * bounded.
We can now state
Theorem 4 . Let £ satisfy Al, A2, A3' and A4. If, in addition, &
satisfies Condition B and L is strictly hypercomplete and quasi-
barrelled, then the conclusion of Theorem 1 holds .
It is well known that a strictly hypercomplete quasibarrelled
space is barrelled; see, for example, [15; Theorem 12-4-3 and Remark
10-4-13]. We do not know if Theorem 4 is true for barrelled spaces.
Our final result presents a sufficient condition under which
Pareto optimal allocations can be exactly decentralized. This
sufficient condition formalizes the requirement of uniformly bounded
marginal rates of substitution of any one production set.
Condition M . There exists f in P and there exists p e L, p > such
that any supporting hyperplane with unit norm, p e L, l|p| = 1, to the
set Y(f) satisfies p > p.
Condition M is an assumption as the parameters of an individual
agent and does not assert that a supporting hyperplane necessarily
exists at a particular boundary point of Y(f).
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Theorem 5 . Let 8 be modelled on (L',L) with L a Banach space and let
& satisfy Al, A2 , A3', A4 and Conditions B and M. Then corresponding
to any Pareto optimal allocation (x*,y*) of &, there exists p* e L ''
such that (p*,(x*,y*)) is a valuation equilibrium of £ .
Remark 2 . Note that Theorem 5 has nothing to say about an exchange
economy, i.e., one where Y(j) = {0} for all j.
Remark 3 . We have presented our exact result in the context of the
setting of Theorem A. It should be clear from an inspection of the
proofs that we could equally well have presented it under the setting
of our other approximate results.
3. Proofs .
We begin with the following elementary result.
Lemma . Let Z.. and Z„ be two subsets of E. Then (a) for any real number
X ^ 0, X(Z
i
n Z
2
) = XZ-O XZ- (b) for any z in E, (Z.n 1^ - (z) =
(Z
1
- z) C\ (Z„ - z); (c) if Z
1
and Z~ are closed convex and such that
z n z
2
* 0, A(Z n z
2
) = a(z )rs a(z
2
).
Proof of Lemma
We begin with (a). For any z in X(Z
1
P\Z„), there exists k in
Z
1
r\ Z„ such that z = Xk which implies z is in (XZ, C\ XZ„). On the
other hand, if z is in \(Z.A Z n ), there exist z. e Z. such that z =12' 11
Xz, = Xz„. Since X ^ 0, z, = z„ and hence z e XZ.. O XZ„.
As regards (b), k e (Z O Z„) - (z) if and only if (k+z) e Z
±
(1-1,2), if and only if k e Z. - z (i=l,2), that is k e (Z - z) O
(Z
2
- z).
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Let ksZ.H Z . Then by (a) and (b), z e [f^XiZ - k)] ^
L
X>0
[P\X(Z 9 - k)] if and only if z e [C\\((Z C\ Z ? ) - k) ]
.
X>0 X>0
Proof of Theorem 1 .
Let (x*,y*) be a Pareto optimal allocation of £ and let
W = E R (x*(t)) - E Y(j) - E x*(t) + E y*(j).
teT jeP teT jeP
where R (x*(t)) is as defined in A2.
The essential part of the proof is to show that W is a closed set
in E. We begin with the case when the Choquet Condition holds. Since
K is bounded from below for
_>, there exists b e E such that K - b is a
subset of E . By the Choquet Condition, K - b is a a(E,F)-complete
subset of E. Since E is an ordered vector space, E contains no
straight line. By A2 , R (x*(t)) is closed, convex for all t in T. We
can now appeal to Choquet 's theorem [3] to assert that £ R (x*(t)) is
teT
closed. Next we show that Y contains no straight line. Suppose it
did, i.e., there exist x, y in E, x * y such that Xx + (l-X)y is in Y
for all real numbers X. This implies (l-X)(y-x) e A(Y) for all X. On
choosing X = and X = 2, we can conclude that (y-x) is in A(Y) and in
-A(Y) = A(-Y). On using (c) of the lemma, we contradict the fact that
Y^(-Y) = {0}. Hence by a second appeal to Choquet's theorem, we can
assert that E Y(j) is closed. For the final step, observe that A3(b)
implies that E
+
CL -Y. Since (K-b) C. E
+
,
K C b - Y. Since E R (x*(t))
teT
is contained in K, we can assert that the set (b-Y) contains
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E R (x*(t)). Since Y is o(E,F)-complete by the Choquet condition,
teT
so is b - Y. We can now make a third appeal to Choquet' s theorem to
assert that E R (x*(t)) - Y + b is closed. This implies that W is
teT
closed and completes the proof of our claim.
Next, we turn to the case when the Dieudonne Condition holds.
Since R (x*(t)) are subsets of a locally compact set, they are locally
compact. Since R (x*(t)) are subsets of K and K is bounded from
below for
_>, there exists b e E such that R (x*(t)) -bCE for all
t in T. Since R (x*(t)) - b is closed and convex, we can take its
asymptotic cone. Since E A E_ = {0}, A(R (x*(t) ) C\ A(R (x*(s)) = {0}
for any t,s in T. We can now appeal to Dieudonne' s theorem to assert
that R (x*(t)) + R (x*(s)) is closed for any t,s in T. The same
argument can be repeated for a given R (x*(u)) and R (x*(t)) + R (x*(s))
Proceeding in this way, we can show that E R (x*(t)) is closed.
teT
Since Y(j) c Y and Y is locally compact, Y(j) is locally compact
for j e P. Furthermore Y(i)A (-Y(j)) = {0} for all i * j in P as a
consequence of Y A. (-Y) = {0}. Hence, by a second appeal to
Dieudonne 's theorem, we can assert that Y(i) + Y(j) is closed. By
repeating this argument for another Y(k), we can show that E Y(j)
jeP
is closed.
Next, we assert that YAE = {0}. If not, there exists y in Y,
y e E and such that y * 0. By A3(b), -y e Y. This implies y e (-Y)
and we contradict the fact that "Y Aj(-T) = {0}. Since K - be E
,
so is its closure K - b. This implies that Y A\(K-b) = {0} which
implies that A(Y) A, A(K) = {0}. Since A( E R (x*(t))C A(K), and Y
teT
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is locally compact, a final appeal to Dieudonne's theorem completes
the proof of our claim that W is closed.
Next, we claim that W C\ E_ = {0}. This is a simple consequence of
A4 and the fact that (x*,y*) is a Pareto optimal allocation of &.
By A2 and A3, W is a nonempty, convex set. For any U e N(E),
choose z e (U r}~E_). We can now apply the second separation theorem
[13, II*9*2] to assert the existence of p e F, p * such that
(1) [w,p] > [z,p] for all w e W.
Since e W, [z,p] < 0. Now let p* = -5p/[z,p]. Then we can rewrite
(1) as
(2) [w,p*] > -6 for all w e W.
Now for any t in T, and any x in R (x*(t)), let v = (x-x*(t)). Cer-
tainly v e W, and hence
(3) [x,p*] > [x*(t),p*] - 6.
Similarly, for any j e P, and any y e Y(j), u = (-y+y*(j)) is an ele-
ment of W. This yields
(4) [y,p*] < [y*(j),p*] + 5.
Finally, we show that p* > 0. Suppose there exists v in E such
that <v,p*> < 0. By A5
,
(x*(t)+kv) e R (x*(t)) for any positive
integer k. This implies k[v,p] > -5 for any k, an obvious
contradiction.
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Proof of Corollary . Since Ky Fan's Theorem 1 [7] shows that nonempty
T(F,E)-lnteriority of K implies that K is a(E,F)-complete, assuming
the former property for K and Y requires no changes in the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Let W be defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1. Our first
claim is that W is 8 (E,F)-closed. Since W is convex, we need only
show that W is 8 (E,F)-sequentially closed. Towards this end, choose a
sequence {w } from W such that the 8(E,F)-limit of w is w. We have
to show w e W. Since w e W, there exist x (t) e R (x*(t)), y (j) e Y(j)
such that
(5) E (x
n (t)-x*(t)) - E (y
n (j)-y*(j)) = w.
teT jeP
Since {w } is a 8 (E,F)-bounded set, there exists a 8 (E,F)-bounded set
B such that
(6) (w
n
+ E x*(t) - E y*(j)) e B for all n.
teT jeP
This implies that
(7) ( E x
n (t)) e ( E X(t))r\(-Y + B)
teT teT
We can now appeal to condition A to assert that {Ex (t)} is a
teT
8(E,F)-bounded set. Since F is quasibarrelled in any compatible
topology, {Ex (t)} is equicontinuous and hence, by Alaoglu-Bourbaki
,
teT
a(E,F)-relatively compact. This implies that there exists a subnet
{Ex (t)} of { E x (t)} which converges in a(E,F) to a limit, say x.
teT teT
It is clear from inspection of the relevant arguments in the proof of
-15-
Theorera 1, that our appeal to Dieudonne's theorem requires local com-
pactness of all but one of R (x*(t)). Hence, Z R (x*(t)) is closed
teT
by Dieudonne Condition II(i). Hence x e Z R (x*(t)).
teT
We can now rewrite (5) as
(8) Z y
V
(j) = Z (x
V (t)-x*(t)) + Z y*(j) - wV
jeP teT jeP
On taking a(E,F)-limits of both sides and on observing that a(E,F)-limit
of {w } is w, we can show that Z y (j) also has a a(E,F)-limit , say y.
jeP
However, as in the proof of Theorem 1, a second application of
Dieudonne's theorem along with Dieudonne Condition II (ii) and A3 yields
the fact that Z Y(j) is closed. Hence there exist y(j) e Y(j) such
jeP
that Z y(j) = y. This implies
(9) w-x- Iy(j)- Z x*(t) + E y*(j).
jeP teT jeP
This completes the proof of the assertion that w e W.
We can now follow the remaining steps in the proof of Theorem 1 to
complete the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 3
Given Ky Fan Condition (i), we can make successive appeals to
Theorem 1 in [7] to assert that Z R (x*(t)) is closed. Also given
teT
Ky Fan Condition (ii), successive appeals to Theorem 1 in [7] allows
us to conclude that Y is closed. We can now repeat the argument in
the proof of Theorem 2 and conclude that x e Z R (x*(t)) and
teT
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—
-
-»
ye E Y(j) without any appeal to Dieudonne Condition II. The re-
jeP
maining steps in the proof of Theorem 2 which call for the repetition
of the corresponding steps in the proof of Theorem 1, remain
unchanged.
Proof of Theorem 4
Let W be defined exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1. Our first
claim is that W is weak * closed. Since L is strictly hypercomplete,
all we need to show is that W Pi U is weak * closed for any U e N(L),
[15, 12-3-7 and 12-2-3]. Towards this end, pick any net {w } from
WH U and such that the weak * limit of {w } is w. We have to show
that we W Pi U . Since w
V
e W, there exist xV (t) e R (x*(t)),
y (j) e Y(j) such that
(10) E x
V
(t) = w
V
+ E y
V
(j) + £ x*(t) - E y*(j)
teT jeP teT jeP
Since w e U , and since (x*,y*) is an allocation, we can appeal to
Condition B to assert that {Ex (t)} is strong * bounded. We can
teT
apply [15, Theorem 10-1-11] to assert that {Ex (t)} is equicon-
teT
tinuous. By Alaoglu-Bourbaki , this implies that there exists a weak
* convergent subnet { E x (t)}. Let the weak * limit of this subnet
teT
be x.
Since {Ex (t)} is a strong * bounded set, so is { E x (t)}.
teT teT
Furthermore, since x (t) e X(t), there exists b e E such that
(x (t) - b)
J>
for all t in T and all p. Since L is a normal cone,
we can appeal to [14, Theorem 3.1, p. 215] to assert that {x (t)} is
strong * bounded. Since L is quasibarrelled, by a second appeal to
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[15, Theorem 10-1-11], we can assert that {x (t)} is equicontinuous.
By Alaoglu-Bourbakl, this implies that there exists a weak * conver-
gent subnet, also denoted by {x (t)}, which tends to a limit x'(t).
Since {x (t)} is a net from R (x*(t)) and the latter is a closed set,
x'(t) e R (x*(t)). By taking as many subnets as necessary, we can
conclude that E x'(t) e E R (x*(t)) and that x = S x'(t).
teT teT teT
Now we can rewrite (10) as
(11) E y
P (j) = -wP + E (x P (t)-x*(t)) + E y*(j).
jeP teT jeP
Since the right hand side tends to a weak * limit, the left hand side
tends to a weak * limit, say y. Since E Y(j) is weak * closed by A3',
jeP
it contains y. This implies that
(12) w = x - y - E x*(t) + E y*(j)
teT jeP
which in turn leads us to conclude that we WflU .
We can now follow the remaining steps in the proof of Theorem 1 to
complete the proof.
Proof of Theorem 5
Since L is strictly hypercomplete [15, 12-3-3], we can proceed
just as in the proofs of Theorem 4 to assert that W is weak * closed
and that is in the norm boundary of W. If the convex set W can be
supported at 0, the proof can be easily completed. If not, we can
appeal to Phelps' theorem [13, Theorem 1] to assert, for each e > 0,
the existence of w e W, II w II < e and p e L/{0} such that
-18-
(13) <w, p > 2 <w . P > for a11 w e W.
Since w e W, there exist x (t) e R (x*(t)) and y (j) e Y(j) such that
(14) <w,P
£
> 2 < E xe Ct) - s ye (j), P£ >
teT jeP
for all w e ( E R (x*(t)) - E Y(j))
teT jeP
Now consider the producer f described in Condition M and deduce from
(14) by appropriate choice of w that
(15) <z, p > < <y (f), p > for all z e Y(f)
This implies that p supports Y(f) at y (f). Without loss of generality
we can assume |p | =1 and thus by Condition M, p > p > 0.
Since the above argument is true for all e > and since p has
unit norm, fp } v ~ has a weak * convergent subnet with limit p*.
' *e e>0
Certainly p* t 0. Furthermore, as z tends to zero, w tends to zero
in norm. Thus, we can rewrite (13) as
(16) <w,p*> 2 for all w e W.
We can now normalize p* to have unit norm and also appeal to A4 to
show that p* e L . Finally, obvious computations complete the proof.
[
-19-
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